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NOTES 
THE DIRECTV NFL SUNDAY TICKET: AN 
ECONOMIC PLEA FOR ANTITRUST LAW 
IMMUNITY 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine two law students in St. Louis, Missouri, one from San Francisco 
and the other from New York, taking their Sunday afternoon study break to 
watch an NFL game. The San Francisco student is a long-time 49ers fan, and 
the New York student is a die-hard Giants fan. They do not want to watch the 
local St. Louis Rams game, but instead prefer to watch the teams they grew 
up cheering for compete against one another. The “DIRECTV NFL Sunday 
Ticket” makes this possible. Without the Sunday Ticket, they might be able 
to watch only the local Rams game.1 
Under the current broadcast contracts with the NFL, ABC, CBS, and 
FOX collectively cover all the weekend2 NFL football games each week.3 
However, within a particular region, a viewer has free access to only a few 
games, which include that market’s home team and other games with local or 
regional interest.4 A subscriber to the Sunday Ticket, however, has the option 
of watching any NFL game live.5 
 1. DIRECTV is a satellite provider which, among other things, offers the Sunday Ticket to its 
subscribers. A subscriber to the Sunday ticket can watch all or part of up to thirteen NFL games each 
Sunday. This amounts to about two hundred games over the entire season. See Wayne Friedman, 
DIRECTV Returns to Football Fans to Drive Business, ADVERTISING AGE, Aug. 2, 1999, at 18, 
available at 1999 WL 8765011. Perhaps more importantly, DIRECTV’s expansive broadcasts of NFL 
games ensure a Sunday Ticket subscriber access to his or her favorite team each week, regardless of 
whether it is broadcast on network television in the fan’s local market. See Dylan Carson, Third 
Circuit Holds NFL’s Sunday Ticket TV Broadcasts Are Not Exempt From Antitrust, SPORTS LAW, 
May-June 1999, at 1, 12. 
 A basic DIRECTV subscription costs between $21.99 and $82.99 per month depending on the 
number and selection of channels included in the package. DIRECTV, DIRECTV Programming, at 
http://www.directv.com/programming/programmingpages/0,1093,135,00.html (last visited Feb. 6, 
2001). A Sunday Ticket subscriber must pay an additional set price per season for the entire package 
of all regular season NFL games. Carson, supra, at 12. See also Friedman, supra (indicating the 
Sunday Ticket cost $159 for the 1999 season); DIRECTV, DIRECTV Sports, at http://www. 
directvsports.com/SubscribeNow/NFLSundayTicket (last visited Feb. 6, 2001) (announcing the price 
of the Sunday Ticket as $149 for the 2001 regular season).  
 2. ESPN usually broadcasts either a Thursday night or Sunday night game each week.  
 3. See Carson, supra note 1, at 1.  
 4. See id. at 1, 12. 
 5. See id. at 12.  
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Recently, Charles Shaw and two other individuals filed a class action suit 
against the National Football League (“NFL”) and its member teams, 
claiming that they had illegally pooled together their broadcasting rights and 
entered into an agreement to sell the package to DIRECTV in violation of 
section 1 of the Sherman Act.6 Shaw alleged that the Sunday Ticket package 
agreement “has restricted the options available to fans for viewing non-
network broadcasts of NFL games, thereby reducing competition and 
artificially raising prices.”7 
The NFL filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on two 
separate grounds.8 First, the NFL claimed that the Sports Broadcasting Act 
(“SBA”) exempts the Sunday Ticket agreement from the Sherman Act.9 
Second, the NFL asserted the single entity defense,10 claiming that because 
the NFL alone sold the teams’ broadcast rights, Shaw did not adequately 
allege joint action necessary to violate section 1 of the Sherman Act.11 The 
district court rejected both of the NFL’s arguments, denied the motion to 
dismiss,12 and certified for interlocutory appeal the question of whether 
subscription satellite broadcasts of NFL games deserve SBA exemption from 
 6. Shaw alleged that the NFL and its teams “combined, in violation of antitrust laws, to fix, 
raise, maintain, or stabilize the price for satellite broadcasts of NFL games. . . . caus[ing] artificially 
high and noncompetitive prices for NFL satellite broadcasts.” Shaw v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, 
Ltd., No. 97-5184, 1998 WL 419765, at *1 (E.D. Pa. June 23, 1998). 
 Section 1 of the Sherman Act states in part: “Every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade or commerce . . . is hereby declared to be illegal . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). 
 7. Shaw, 1998 WL 419765, at *1. 
 8. Id.  
 9. Id. The SBA, which acts as an absolute exemption from the Sherman Act for sports telecasts 
that fall within its scope, states in part: 
The antitrust laws . . . shall not apply to any joint agreement by or among persons engaging in or 
conducting the organized professional team sports of football . . . by which any league of clubs 
participating in professional football . . . contests sells or otherwise transfers all or any part of the 
rights of such league’s member clubs in the sponsored telecasting of the games of football . . . 
engaged in or conducted by such clubs . . . .  
Sports Broadcasting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1997) (emphasis added). See infra Part II.B for a 
discussion of the facts leading Congress to enact the SBA. 
 10. See discussion infra Part II.C for the history of the single entity defense with a focus on its 
application to professional sports leagues. 
 11. Shaw, 1998 WL 419765, at *1.  
 12. Id. at *5. While the district court certified for interlocutory appeal the question of SBA 
exemption arising from the NFL’s first defense, it flatly rejected the NFL’s single entity defense. Id. 
The court initially relied on L.A. Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National Football League, 726 
F.2d 1381, 1390 (9th Cir. 1984), which held that the NFL alone was not a single entity for antitrust 
purposes. Shaw, 1998 WL 419765, at *5. The court further noted that Shaw did not allege that the 
NFL acted alone to violate the Sherman Act, but instead alleged that all the member clubs illegally 
conspired in restraint of trade. This, the court said, was a sufficient allegation to survive a motion to 
dismiss. See id. 
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the Sherman Act.13  
In Shaw, the Third Circuit became the first to address the issue of whether 
the SBA exemption to the Sherman Act applies to the NFL’s sale to 
DIRECTV.14 That court conclusively decided that the current SBA applies 
only to sponsored telecasts on free television and not to DIRECTV and other 
satellite providers.15 The NFL conceded that the Sunday Ticket package of 
satellite broadcasts is not “sponsored telecasting”16 within the meaning of the 
SBA.17 Nonetheless, the NFL argued that after it sold its teams’ pooled 
broadcast rights to a sponsored network like ABC, CBS, or FOX in 
compliance with the SBA, it reserved residual rights in the sponsored 
telecasts of each game.18 The NFL claimed that these residual rights in the 
sponsored telecast of each game retain the SBA exemption granted to the 
initial pooled sale of broadcast rights to the sponsored network.19 The NFL 
asserted that it sold these residual rights in the sponsored telecasts to 
DIRECTV for the Sunday Ticket, thus claiming that the sale of these residual 
rights to DIRECTV deserved the same SBA exemption from the Sherman 
Act that the initial sale to the sponsored network like ABC, CBS, or FOX 
enjoyed.20  
The Third Circuit disagreed with the NFL, holding that the NFL’s 
residual rights are in the “games themselves” and not in the sponsored 
telecasts of those games.21 The court found a difference between the initial 
sale of pooled broadcast rights to a sponsored network and the subsequent 
sale to a non-sponsored network like DIRECTV.22 The court held that 
“[e]ach transaction is a sale of a part of the NFL’s underlying right in the 
 13. See Shaw v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., 172 F.3d 299, 299-300 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 14. 172 F.3d at 299. 
 15. 172 F.3d at 302. 
 16. The Third Circuit in Shaw explained that “‘sponsored telecasting’ refers to broadcasts which 
are financed by business enterprises (the ‘sponsors’) in return for advertising time and are therefore 
provided free to the general public.” 172 F.3d at 301. The district court in Shaw had earlier defined the 
“sponsor” of a “sponsored telecast[]” within the scope of SBA exemption, as “‘[o]ne that finances a 
project or an event carried out by another person or group, especially a business enterprise that pays 
for radio or television programming in return for advertising time.’” 1998 WL 419765, at *3 (quoting 
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 17411 (3d ed. 1992)). See also 
15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1997) (exempting from antitrust laws the “rights . . . in sponsored telecasting”).  
 17. 172 F.3d at 301. 
 18. See id.   
 19. See id. at 301-02.  
 20. See id. 
 21. See id. at 301-03. 
 22. A sponsored network is one that engages in sponsored telecasting of events so that they are 
free to the public. See id. at 302. DIRECTV is a non-sponsored network, as evidenced by the monthly 
cost to the public for its general broadcasts and its yearly charge for the Sunday Ticket. See supra note 
1.  
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images of the games, but only the former is exempt from antitrust scrutiny.”23 
At the time of publication of this Note, the case remained open in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania while the parties 
negotiated a settlement.24 
Part II of this Note discusses the congressional and judicial history of the 
Sherman Act, the Sports Broadcasting Act, and the single entity defense, 
focusing on various professional sports leagues’ attempts to utilize the 
defense. Part III further examines the two issues raised by the NFL’s 
defenses to Sherman Act scrutiny in Shaw and analyzes cases and 
commentary that have addressed similar issues. Part IV of this Note proposes 
two possible solutions that would allow consumers continued benefits from 
the Sunday Ticket within the confines of antitrust law. First, this Note will 
argue that even though the Third Circuit’s denial of the SBA exemption in 
Shaw appears sound when measured against the language and history of the 
Act, economic considerations should push Congress to amend the SBA to 
allow a supplemental exemption for pooled television contracts with 
DIRECTV and other satellite providers in the future. Under the proposed 
amendment, a pooled broadcast contract between the NFL and DIRECTV 
would escape Sherman Act scrutiny so long as the events are also broadcast 
on free sponsored television in the local market for those consumers who do 
not wish to pay DIRECTV for the additional games. Second, until Congress 
amends the SBA, courts should follow the U.S. Supreme Court’s structural 
test utilized in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.25 when 
analyzing the applicability of the single entity defense to professional sports 
leagues. In applying this structural test, courts should recognize that when 
 23. 172 F.3d at 301-02. In declaring that the SBA exempted only the sale of pooled broadcast 
rights to sponsored networks, the court looked both to the language of the SBA itself, see id. at 301-02, 
15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1997), and to the legislative history of the Act. 172 F.3d at 302-03. See also infra 
Part II.B for a brief discussion of the legislative history of the SBA.  
 The NFL argued that the DIRECTV broadcasts utilize television images fed from the sponsored 
network cameras, and therefore the SBA exemption for DIRECTV derives from the exemption granted 
to the sponsored telecasts. The court disagreed:  
The use of the same signal for broadcast over two media, however, does not render the rights in 
one broadcast derivative of rights in the other. One could just as readily conclude that the network 
television broadcast rights are derivative, and constitute part of the NFL’s rights in the non-
sponsored satellite broadcast.  
172 F.3d at 301-02 n.9. 
 24. Telephone Interview with the Office of the Clerk of the Court, United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (May 14, 2001). On May 10, 2001, the district court published 
a memorandum stating that the case “shall be maintained for settlement purposes as a class action.” Id. 
A hearing is scheduled for July 9, 2001 “to consider the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the 
settlement,” which the parties are to have reached by such date. Id. 
 25. 467 U.S. 752 (1984). 
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selling its pooled broadcast rights to a television network, the NFL is acting 
as a single entity incapable of conspiring with itself in violation of section 1 
of the Sherman Act. 
II. HISTORY OF THE SHERMAN ACT, THE SPORTS BROADCASTING ACT, 
AND THE USE OF THE SINGLE ENTITY DEFENSE BY PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 
LEAGUES 
A. The Sherman Act26 
The notion of invalidating all contracts that restrain trade originated in 
English common law in the early 1700s.27 A “contract in restraint of trade” 
initially referred to a contract in which an individual voluntarily agreed to 
discontinue his trade or calling in order to increase the marketability of his 
business by eliminating himself as a possible competitor.28 Eventually, 
English common law prohibited all contracts designed to bring about at least 
one of the evils of monopoly29 and specifically condemned contracts leading 
to artificially high prices.30 However, as the English common law developed, 
individuals could enter into or abstain from entering into any reasonable 
contract they wished, so long as the resulting restraint of trade did not imply 
a wrongful purpose of the contract.31 Present-day courts refer to the common 
 26. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994). An extensive discussion of the history of the Sherman Act is 
beyond the scope of this Note. For an in-depth analysis of the economic conditions and legislative 
history leading Congress to enact the Sherman Act, see ELEANOR M. FOX & LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON ANTITRUST 22-37 (1989).  
 27. See Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 51 (1911). See also id. at 54 (explaining that 
the English court termed a monopoly a restraint of trade in 1711 in Mitchel v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 
347 (K.B. 1711)). For a discussion of Mitchel v. Reynolds, see infra notes 31-32. 
 28. See 221 U.S. at 51. These restraints on a person’s right to carry on his trade were illegal 
“because it was deemed they were injurious to the public as well as to the individuals who made 
them.” Id.  
 29. At common law, the public outcry against monopolies stemmed from three general “evil” 
consequences of monopolies. First, monopolists could fix prices at a higher level than would normally 
result if competition existed. Second, monopolists could decrease the quantity of the good they 
produced. Third, the lack of other businesses to compete with the monopolist could lead to a 
deterioration in the quality of the monopolized product. Id. at 52.  
 30. See id. at 54. English courts believed that a monopolist could abuse his place in the market 
and arbitrarily set prices at an artificially high level, e.g., at a higher level than would naturally result if 
competition existed and firms had to compete for business by lowering prices to the public. See id. at 
52. See also Case of Monopolies, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B. 1603) (explaining English common law 
belief that monopolists will set artificially high prices). 
 31. See 221 U.S. at 56. Due to an interest in the freedom to contract, common law courts only 
prohibited “general” restraints on a person’s ability to carry on his previous trade. Therefore, the courts 
allowed restraints that were partial, or specific in time and place, and otherwise reasonable. See id. The 
most famous analysis of “general” versus “specific” restraints of trade at English common law 
occurred in Mitchel v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (K.B. 1711). In Mitchel, the seller of a bakery 
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law standard of allowing reasonable contracts in restraint of trade as the 
“Rule of Reason.”32  
Around 1880, businesses in the United States began to form “trusts”33 as a 
tool for promoting cooperation and progressive corporate development.34 As 
large trusts gained monopolistic control over certain markets, the general 
public quickly turned against them, fearing that the decrease in competition 
would lead to inefficient business decisions and corresponding high prices.35 
Many states initially attempted to check the growth of trusts and monopolies 
with state antitrust statutes or state common law.36  
As in England, early state antitrust law prohibited all contracts that unduly 
diminished competition and increased prices to artificially high levels.37 
Moreover, the prohibition of restraints of trade in early state laws stemmed 
from a desire to protect the general public from the same evils of monopoly 
recognized by English common law.38 Naturally, then, the Rule of Reason, as 
applied in England, became the general standard in the United States for 
judging the legality of contracts in restraint of trade.39 Thus, early state courts 
invalidated “all contracts or acts which were unreasonably restrictive of 
promised that he would not compete with the purchaser of his business for 5 years in the area in which 
the bakery had operated. The court upheld the covenant not to compete. The court explained that the 
covenant only prevented the seller of the business from working in a particular place and therefore 
declared the contract valid. Id. at 351. The court also indicated that it might void a similar covenant if 
the covenant imposed a “general” duty not to compete throughout the entire kingdom for an 
undisclosed amount of time. Id. at 350. 
 32. See, e.g., Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) [hereinafter 
Society of Engineers]. The Court in Society of Engineers traced the Rule of Reason back to the English 
common law case of Mitchel v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep 347 (K.B. 1711), the “earliest of cases applying 
the Rule of Reason.” 435 U.S. at 688. The Court noted that the Rule of Reason focuses on the alleged 
restraint’s impact on competition in the relevant market. Id. The Court noted that in Mitchel, the 
English court upheld the covenant as “reasonable, even though it deprived the public of the benefit of 
potential competition. The long-run benefit of enhancing the marketability of the business itself—and 
thereby providing incentives to develop such an enterprise—outweighed the temporary and limited 
loss of competition.” 435 U.S. at 688-89.  
 33. Several corporations joined together and formed a “trust” by “‘turn[ing] their stock over to a 
board of trustees [and] receiving in return trust certificates of equivalent value.’ Each participating 
corporation retained its individual state charter, but all participants were subject to the control of the 
newly formed, unincorporated entity that held their stock.” FOX & SULLIVAN, supra note 26, at 27 
(citation omitted). By forming trusts held by unincorporated entities, the member corporations escaped 
usual state law limitations on the size and scope of an individual corporation. Id.  
 34. See id. at 30-31.  
 35. See id.  
 36. See id. at 33. 
 37. See Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 56-57 (1911). 
 38. See id. at 58-59. See also supra note 29 for a discussion of the three evils that English 
common law recognized could stem from monopolies. 
 39. See 221 U.S. at 59. The Court, after explaining the Rule of Reason applied at early state 
common law in the United States, noted, “But this again, as we have seen, simply followed the line of 
development of the law of England.” Id.  
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competitive conditions” to the extent they “[gave] rise to the inference or 
presumption that they had been entered into or done with the intent to do 
wrong to the general public . . . .”40 
In the late 1880s,41 Congress recognized that state antitrust statutes and 
state common law had proved ineffective at curbing the effects of trusts on 
interstate commerce and the public generally.42 Dissatisfied with the lack of 
federal common law to govern antitrust offenses in interstate commerce, 
Congress enacted the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890.43  
Section 1 of the Sherman Act states in part: “Every contract, combination 
. . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is hereby declared to 
be illegal.”44 In 1911, the Supreme Court first analyzed the language of 
section 1 of the Sherman Act in Standard Oil v. United States,45 and courts 
 40. Id. at 58.  
 41. See id. at 50.  
 42. See FOX & SULLIVAN, supra note 26, at 33; Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 50. The Standard Oil 
Court noted that:  
[T]he main cause which led to the [Sherman Act] was the thought it was required by the economic 
conditions of the times, that is, the vast accumulation of wealth in the hands of corporations and 
individuals, the enormous development of corporate organization, . . . and that combinations 
known as trusts were being multiplied, and the widespread impression that their power had been 
and would be exerted to oppress individuals and injure the public generally. 
221 U.S. at 50. See also, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (noting that the 
intent of the Sherman Act was to protect from threats against consumer welfare); Shaw v. Dallas 
Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., 172 F.3d 299, 300 n.4 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[T]he antitrust laws were 
designed for the protection of the public.”). 
 43. Sherman Act of 1890, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994)). 
 During a debate in the Senate, questions arose regarding the need for federal legislation to regulate 
trusts, monopolies, and the resulting restraints of trade. After an explanation of what a “monopoly” 
referred to in section 2 of the proposed Sherman Act, the following exchange occurred: 
 Mr. Kenna. If the Senator will permit me, I should like to ask him whether a monopoly such 
as he defines is prohibited at common law . . . . 
 Mr. Hoar. I so understand it. 
 Mr. Kenna. Then why should this bill proceed to denounce that very monopoly? 
 Mr. Hoar. Because there is not any common law of the United States. 
 Mr. Kenna. There is a common law in nearly every State in the Union. 
 Mr. Hoar. I know. The common law in the States of the Union of course extends over citizens 
and subjects over which the State itself has jurisdiction. Now we are dealing with an offense 
against interstate . . . commerce, which the State cannot regulate by penal enactment, and we find 
the United States without any common law. The great thing this bill does . . . is to extend the 
common-law principles, which protected fair competition in trade in old times in England, to 
international and interstate commerce in the United States. 
21 CONG. REC. 3,152 (1890), reprinted in FOX & SULLIVAN, supra note 26, at 35. See also Standard 
Oil, 221 U.S. at 50 (“The debates show that doubt as to whether there was a common law of the United 
States which governed that subject in the absence of legislation was among the influences leading to 
the passage of the act.”). 
 44. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). 
 45. 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
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still follow this interpretation today.46 The Court initially observed that 
judges should construe the words in the statute as having the same meaning 
they had at common law.47 To this extent, the Court assumed that Congress 
drafted the Sherman Act to incorporate the common law disfavor of restraints 
of trade.48 The Court acknowledged that Congress intended to formulate a 
standard for regulating interstate commerce,49 but because the Sherman Act 
was so broad,50 the Court could not read a workable rule written into the 
statute.51 The Court recognized that at the time Congress drafted the Sherman 
Act, many new forms of contracts were evolving.52 The Court therefore 
determined that Congress had drafted the statute broadly enough to embrace 
every conceivable type of future contract that might lead to an undue restraint 
of trade.53 However, understanding that every contract restrains trade by 
limiting future business options to those agreed upon in the contract, 
Congress probably did not intend section 1 of the Sherman Act to prohibit 
“[e]very contract . . . in restraint of trade;” doing so would eliminate the right 
to contract altogether.54 Thus, because Congress provided no express rule 
delineating which contracts constituted an unlawful restraint of trade in the 
Sherman Act’s language,55 the Supreme Court concluded that courts should 
apply the Rule of Reason as applied at English common law and in early 
state law in the United States.56 Therefore, as a matter of public policy, 
 46. See, e.g., Nynex Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 133 (1998) (citing Standard Oil to 
support finding that section 1 of the Sherman Act “prohibits only agreements that unreasonably 
restrain trade”). 
 47. 221 U.S. at 59. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See id. at 60.  
 51. See id. at 59 (“[T]he question is, what was the rule which it adopted?”). See also id. at 60 
where the Court, in deciding Congress had not included a standard for analysis into the Sherman Act’s 
language, noted, “Thus not specifying but indubitably contemplating and requiring a standard . . . .” Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 59-60. The Court acknowledged that Congress did not expressly define prohibited 
contracts so as to allow the statute to “embrace every conceivable contract or combination which could 
be made concerning trade of commerce.” Id. at 60. 
 54. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 63 (recognizing that the Court must have 
room to exercise its own judgment on which contracts to void under section 1, because to hold 
otherwise would be destructive of all right to contract or trade in all goods in interstate commerce); 
Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687-88 (1978) (“[T]he language of § 1 of 
the Sherman Act . . . cannot mean what it says. The statute says ‘every’ contract that restrains trade is 
unlawful. But . . . restraint is the very essence of every contract; read literally, section 1 would outlaw 
the entire body of private contract law.”); United States v. Joint Traffic Assn., 171 U.S. 505, 510 
(1898) (explaining that Congress could not have intended that courts invalidate every contract in 
restraint of trade because all contracts restrain trade).  
 55. See supra note 51.  
 56. 221 U.S. at 60. See also Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 688 (“The legislative history [of 
the Sherman Act] makes it perfectly clear that . . . courts [are] to give shape to the statute’s broad 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss1/4
p287 note Crandall.doc  7/17/01   5:08 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2001] DIRECTV NFL SUNDAY AND ANTITRUST LAW 295 
 
 
 
 
 
section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits only those “contracts or acts which 
[are] unreasonably restrictive of competitive conditions . . . .”57 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act states in part: “Every person who shall 
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize . . . any part of the trade or commerce 
among the several states . . . shall be deemed guilty . . . .”58 Section 1, which 
Charles Shaw alleged the NFL teams violated with the Sunday Ticket, 
clearly prohibits only multiple parties from contracting, combining, or 
conspiring to restrain trade.59 However, a single person60 or corporation61 can 
violate section 2 of the Sherman Act.62  
B. The Sports Broadcasting Act 
Congress passed the Sports Broadcasting Act63 in 1961 as a response to 
the 1953 decision in United States v. National Football League (“National 
Football League I”).64 In National Football League I, the District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that Article X of the NFL’s bylaws, 
which restricted telecasts of outside games into a team’s local market while 
that team played an away game, constituted an “unreasonable and illegal 
restraint of trade”65 in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.66 
mandate by drawing on common-law tradition.”). 
 57. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 58 (explaining the Rule of Reason at common law).  
 58. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).  
 59. See 15 U.S.C. § 1. It is impossible for a single party to “contract, combin[e] . . . or 
conspir[e]” with oneself. Therefore, the language of section 1 requires multiple parties working 
together for a violation. Id.  
 60. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (stating “[e]very person who shall monopolize”) (emphasis added). 
 61. See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 61 (“It is certain that the word ‘person’ clearly implies a 
corporation as well as an individual”). See also, e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 
467 U.S. 752, 767 (1984) (“The conduct of a single firm is governed by § 2 alone . . . .”). 
 62. 15 U.S.C. § 2. 
 63. 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1997). See supra note 9 for the relevant SBA language. 
 64. United States v. Nat’l Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953), superseded by 
Sports Broadcasting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1997). 
 65. Nat’l Football League I, 116 F. Supp. at 327. To better understand the District Court’s 
holdings and rationale discussed directly below, assume the following: (1) There are only four teams 
in the NFL: teams A, B, C, and D; (2) Teams A and B are small market teams with financial problems 
and a minimal fan base due to poor performance on the field; (3) Teams C and D are large market 
teams who prosper financially due to a larger fan base and success on the field.  
 
 First, the District Court held that the NFL’s restriction of telecasts of outside games (for instance, 
C vs. D) into the home territory of a another team (A) on days when team A played a home game (for 
instance, A vs. B at A’s home field) was reasonable, and thus not an “illegal” restraint of trade. See id. 
at 326. The court explained that “[t]here can be little doubt that this provision constitutes a contract in 
restraint of trade.” Id. at 322. The court explained that by giving each team the right to market its own 
games without competition in its own home area, the NFL policy restricts outside competition and is 
therefore a “clear case of allocating marketing territories among competitors, which is a practice 
generally held illegal under the anti-trust laws.” Id. Nevertheless, the court explained that the policy 
actually preserved the NFL as a whole by helping the weaker financial teams like A and B, compete 
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As noted above, the 1953 decision in National Football League I did not 
pass judgment on a pooled contract between the NFL teams and a single 
television network.67 However, certain language in the final judgment 
prompted questions by the NFL as to whether a court might construe the 
decree to forbid the teams from pooling their broadcast rights and contracting 
with a television station to broadcast all league games.68 Specifically, section 
V of the decree enjoined the NFL teams from “entering into . . . any contract 
. . . with the [NFL] or any member club or the [NFL] . . . with the effect of 
restricting the areas within which broadcasts . . . of games . . . may be 
made.”69 In 1961, the NFL filed a petition seeking a determination that a 
with the stronger financial teams like C and D; the policy added to the weaker team A’s home 
attendance and ticket revenue by preventing potential live spectators in the weaker team A’s market 
from staying home from A’s game to watch stronger teams like C and D compete on television. See id. 
at 325. The court concluded that by preserving the NFL as a whole, the policy promoted competition 
more than it restrained competition and was a reasonable, and therefore legal, restraint of trade. See id. 
See also Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 58 (recognizing that the Sherman Act prohibits only those 
“contracts or acts which [are] unreasonably restrictive of competitive conditions”).  
 Second, the court held that the NFL policy which restricted telecasting outside games (for 
instance, C vs. D) in a team A’s home territory when team A was playing an away game (for instance, 
A vs. B but at B’s home field now) was unreasonable, and thus an “illegal” restraint of trade. See Nat’l 
Football League I, 116 F. Supp. at 327. The court again focused its “reasonableness” analysis on the 
policy’s possible effects on the attendance of a team’s home games. See id. at 326. Because the weaker 
team A was now playing an away game at B’s home field, the threat of A losing live spectators to a 
telecast of an outside game (for instance, C vs. D) disappeared. Whether the outside game between C 
and D was shown in A’s market or not, A’s local fans would not see A play live (without traveling to 
B’s market, of course). See id. at 326. The policy of restricting the outside broadcast in no way helped 
weaker teams compete with the stronger financial teams. Therefore, while the restraint on trade was 
the same, namely the restriction on competition from outside broadcasts, the latter situation lacked the 
accompanying promotion of competition that the former situation achieved. See id. at 326-27. 
 66. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). See also supra note 6 for relevant section 1 language. 
 67. See Telecasting of Professional Sports Contests: Hearings on H.R. 8757 Before the Antitrust 
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong. 6 (1961) [hereinafter Aug. 28 Hearings]. 
Referring to the 1953 decree, Pete Rozelle, then commissioner of the NFL, stated that “[t]his litigation 
had nothing to do with single network television programming by the National Football League. 
Neither the Philadelphia court nor any other court has ever decided that a single network plan violates 
antitrust laws . . . .” See also supra note 65 (discussing the holdings of the 1953 decree in National 
Football League I). 
 68. See Aug. 28 Hearings, supra note 67, at 6 (testimony of NFL commissioner Pete Rozelle).  
 69. Final Judgment, Section V, Nat’l Football League I, 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953), 
reprinted in Aug. 28 Hearings, supra note 67, at 24-26. The NFL questioned the application of Section 
V of the Final Judgment, which stated in part: 
The defendants [NFL member teams] are jointly and severally restrained and enjoined from 
directly or indirectly entering into . . . any contract, agreement, or understanding with the [NFL] or 
any member club of the [NFL], through league By-Laws or otherwise, having the purpose or 
effect of restricting the areas within which broadcasts or telecasts of games participated in by 
member clubs of the [NFL] may be made . . . .   
Id. The section V language naturally bothered the NFL because the member teams would necessarily 
need to agree to restrict the areas of telecasts to make a single network contract successful; a single 
network could not possibly televise all games into every market nationwide because all teams played 
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contract between the NFL and CBS, which gave CBS exclusive broadcast 
rights to telecast all league games,70 did not violate the 1953 final 
judgment.71 The court stated that even though a single network contract was 
not at issue in the 1953 decision, it felt “obliged” to read the language in 
Section V of its 1953 decree as prohibiting the pooled contract between the 
NFL and CBS.72 
In response to the district court’s construction of the 1953 final judgment 
in National Football League II,73 Congress enacted the SBA to overturn the 
decree and to “enable the member teams of a league to pool their separate 
television rights and to sell the resulting package of pooled rights to a . . . 
television network.”74 The Chairman of the House Antitrust Subcommittee 
recognized that the SBA was necessary “to assure a significant share of 
television revenue to [the NFL’s] weaker teams, whose economic survival is 
essential to the continued operation of the league itself.”75 The legislative 
history of the SBA indicates that Congress, by specifically addressing 
“sponsored telecasting”76 of professional sports contests in the language of 
at basically the same time on Sunday afternoon. 
 70. The 1961 contract between the NFL and CBS granted CBS the exclusive right to televise all 
NFL games each week nationwide except the Championship Game. See United States v. Nat’l Football 
League, 196 F. Supp. 445, 446 (E.D. Pa. 1961) [hereinafter Nat’l Football League II] (construing Final 
Judgment of 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953)). Prior to the league contract with CBS, each NFL team 
individually negotiated a separate television contract with whichever network offered the best deal. 
See id. After the 1961 contract, all teams agreed to eliminate competition among themselves in sales of 
their broadcast rights, and further agreed to pool their broadcast rights together and allow NFL 
commissioner Pete Rozelle to sell the package as a whole to CBS. Id. at 447. 
 71. See 196 F. Supp. at 446. 
 72. Id. at 447. See Aug. 28 Hearings, supra note 67, at 6 (testimony of NFL commissioner Pete 
Rozelle). Mr. Rozelle testified that “a single network contract was not ‘at issue [in National Football 
League I]’ and the court could not remember why ‘[Section V of the Final Judgment] was put into [the 
decree].’ The court further said, ‘Yet words mean what they say. I have to take the words as they are.’” 
Id. But see generally Nat’l Football League II, 196 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Pa. 1961) (not containing the 
language referred to above by Mr. Rozelle).  
 See also Nat’l Football League II, 196 F. Supp. at 447. The district court noted that the NFL, in its 
petition for construction of the 1953 decree, stated the following regarding the execution of its contract 
with CBS: “Said contract provides that [CBS] shall have the right to determine, entirely with its own 
discretion without consulting the commissioner or any club of the [NFL] which games shall be telecast 
and where such games be televised.” Id. The court then concluded: 
Clearly this provision restricts the individual clubs from determining ‘the areas within which . . . 
telecasts of games . . . may be made . . . ,’ since defendants have by their contract given to CBS 
the power to determine which games shall be telecast and where the games shall be televised. I am 
therefore obliged to construe the Final Judgment as prohibiting the execution and performance of 
the contract . . . . 
Id. 
 73. Nat’l Football League II, 196 F. Supp. 445. 
 74. Aug. 28 Hearings, supra note 67, at 1. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See supra note 16 for explanation of “sponsored telecasting” within the meaning of the SBA. 
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the SBA, intended to exempt the sale of pooled broadcast packages to free 
television networks only.77 Because courts must construe exemptions to the 
antitrust laws narrowly,78 they have continuously refused to extend an SBA 
exemption beyond free television to cable79 and satellite broadcasts of 
professional sports.80 
 77. The SBA language only specifically mentions an antitrust exemption for “sponsored 
telecasting” of professional sports games. 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1997). Moreover, the legislative history 
of the SBA clearly shows that Congress’s intent was to exempt only free broadcasts. The legislative 
report on the SBA states that “[t]he [SBA] does not apply to closed circuit or subscription television.” 
Telecasting of Professional Sports Contests: Hearings on H.R. 8757 Before the Antitrust Subcomm. of 
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong. 4 (1961) [hereinafter Sept. 13 Hearings]. Furthermore, 
during the congressional hearings, a member of the Antitrust Subcommittee asked Pete Rozelle, “You 
understand, do you not, Mr. Rozelle, that this Bill covers only the free telecasting of professional 
sports contest, and does not cover pay T.V.?” Mr. Rozelle replied, “Absolutely.” August 28 Hearings, 
supra note 67, at 36. What is missing from the SBA congressional hearings is Congress’s rationale for 
limiting the SBA to “sponsored telecasting” on free television. See Aug. 28 Hearings, supra note 67; 
Sept. 13 Hearings, supra. It appears that Congress limited the scope of the SBA to “sponsored 
telecasting” of professional sports because the statute was special interest legislation, enacted 
specifically to reverse the district court’s invalidation of the 1961 contract between the NFL and CBS 
in National Football League II. See Shaw v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., No. Civ.A. 97-5184, 
1998 WL 419765, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 23, 1998); August 28 Hearings, supra note 67, at 1-3. “Thus 
SBA’s legislative context and the specific concern it sought to address was focused upon but one 
target: the sale of games to a sponsored television network.” Shaw, 1998 WL 419765, at *4. 
 78. See, e.g., Shaw v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., 172 F.3d 299, 301 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(“Our first task is to consider the plain meaning of the statute, heeding the Supreme Court’s direction 
that exceptions to the antitrust laws must be narrowly construed.”) (citing Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. 
Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 126 (1982) (holding that antitrust exemptions must be construed narrowly 
because exceptions compromise Congress’s “longstanding . . . commitment to the policy of free 
markets and open competition”)); Chicago Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 961 
F.2d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that “courts read exceptions to the antitrust laws narrowly with 
beady eyes and green eyeshades”).  
 79. See, e.g., Chicago Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 95 F.3d 593, 596 (7th 
Cir. 1996) (holding that the SBA does not exempt from the antitrust laws a contract dividing 
broadcasts of NBA games between NBC and cable stations such as TBS, TNT, and WGN); Chicago 
Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 808 F. Supp. 646, 650 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (concluding 
that showing NBA games on TNT cable station was not “sponsored telecasting” within meaning of 
SBA even though it contained commercial advertisements because viewers still had to pay to get the 
station). See also Letter from the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice to the Senate 
Judiciary Committee 4-5 (Mar. 30, 1998), quoted in Chicago Sports P’ship, 808 F. Supp. at 650 
(“While we believe there is some question as to whether programming such as ESPN’s NFL games 
that is partly supported by advertisers and partly by viewers is ‘sponsored telecasting,’ our view is that 
it is not and thus does not come within the [SBA’s] exemption.”).  
 80. See Shaw, 172 F.3d at 302 (holding that the SBA does not exempt a contract between the 
NFL and DIRECTV satellite provider from the Sherman Act). 
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C. The Single Entity Defense by Professional Sports Leagues 
1. Early Single Entity Defense Litigation 
The single entity defense in its most basic form states that two or more 
organizations acting together as a single economic entity cannot violate 
section 1 of the Sherman Act81 because a single entity cannot combine or 
conspire with itself.82 A “single economic entity” does not necessarily have a 
precise definition. Rather, the Supreme Court uses a functional test, treating 
multiple organizations as a “single economic entity” if they have a common 
economic objective and a single corporate consciousness.83  
A professional sports league first prominently asserted the single entity 
defense in 1980 in North American Soccer League v. NFL.84 The North 
American Soccer League (“NASL”) sued the NFL, claiming the NFL’s 
cross-ownership rule, which prohibited NFL owners from concurrently 
owning a professional sports team in a different league, violated section 1 of 
the Sherman Act.85 In its complaint, NASL alleged that the cross-ownership 
rule excluded it from the market for professional sports capital and the NFL 
owners’ entrepreneurial skills.86  
In NASL, the district court dismissed NASL’s claim, concluding that the 
NFL was a single economic entity, that it could not combine or conspire with 
itself, and therefore that it could not violate section 1 of the Sherman Act.87 
The Second Circuit rejected this view.88 The Second Circuit claimed that 
even if the court characterized the NFL as a single economic entity, this 
characterization did not exempt an agreement among its members to restrain 
trade from section 1 of the Sherman Act.89 The Second Circuit reversed the 
 81. Section 1 of the Sherman Act states in part: “Every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, 
in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is hereby declared to be illegal.” 15 U.S.C.  § 1 (1994). 
 82. Actually, the single entity defense, as approved by the United States Supreme Court, only 
holds that a wholly owned subsidiary is incapable of conspiring with its parent corporation in violation 
of section 1 of the Sherman Act. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 
777 (1984). However, Part II.C of this note explains how several courts have extended the defense to 
situations in which two formally distinct organizations act with identical economic interests, i.e., as a 
single economic entity.  
 83. See infra notes 129-31 and accompanying text. 
 84. N. Am. Soccer League v. Nat’l Football League, 505 F. Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev’d, 
670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982) [hereinafter NASL].  
 85. NASL, 505 F. Supp. at 662.  
 86. NASL, 459 U.S. at 1075 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (quoting NASL’s 
Complaint).  
 87. NASL, 505 F. Supp. at 689. 
 88. NASL, 670 F.2d at 1256. 
 89. Id. at 1257. The court of appeals rejected the single entity defense, stating that “[t]he 
characterization of NFL as a single economic entity does not exempt from the Sherman Act an 
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district court and, after applying the Rule of Reason analysis,90 held that the 
NFL’s cross ownership rule violated section 1.91 The Supreme Court denied 
certiorari, but Justice Rehnquist wrote a strong dissenting opinion from the 
denial of certiorari92 in which he argued that the NFL operated as a single 
economic entity.93 Justice Rehnquist reasoned that the NFL competes as one 
unit against other sports leagues and other forms of entertainment for the 
limited entertainment dollar in a given consumer’s budget.94 
In 1984, the NFL again unsuccessfully asserted the single entity defense 
in the Ninth Circuit in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. NFL 
(L.A. Coliseum).95 In L.A. Coliseum, the Coliseum Commission sued the 
NFL under section 1 of the Sherman Act, claiming that Rule 4.3 of Article 
IV of the NFL Constitution,96 which prevented Oakland Raiders owner Al 
agreement between its members to restrain competition.” Id. The court of appeals relied in part on two 
Supreme Court cases that had earlier rejected the single entity defense altogether. See id. at 1256 
(citing Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968), overruled by 
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. 
United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951), overruled by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 
U.S. 752 (1984)). The Supreme Court later reversed its ground and recognized the single entity 
defense as a viable argument in Copperweld, discussed infra at notes 111-131 and accompanying text, 
thereby overruling its prior holdings in Perma Life Mufflers and Timken Roller Bearing.  
 90. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Rule of Reason. 
 91. NASL, 670 F.2d at 1260-61.  
 92. NASL, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). See also 
Chicago Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 95 F.3d 593, 599 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting a 
“strong dissent from the denial of certiorari in the soccer case”). 
 93. 459 U.S. at 1077. 
 94. Id. The Supreme Court would not endorse the single entity defense as a complete bar to 
section 1 liability until two years after its denial of certiorari in NASL. See infra notes 114-18 and 
accompanying text for the Court’s recognition of the single entity defense in Copperweld Corp. v. 
Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984). Thus, while Justice Rehnquist argued that the NFL 
acts as a single unit, he still proceded in his dissent with a Rule of Reason analysis. However, courts 
have since cited a portion of his opinion as persuasive authority for the application of the single entity 
defense to professional sports leagues, thereby removing them from the scope of section 1 altogether. 
See, e.g., Chicago Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 95 F.3d 593, 599-600 (7th Cir. 
1996) (citing Justice Rehnquist’s dissent while concluding the “NBA is closer to a single firm than a 
group of independent firms”). Justice Rehnquist explained: 
The NFL owners are joint venturers who produce a product, professional football, which 
competes with other sports and other forms of entertainment in the entertainment market. 
Although individual NFL teams compete with one another on the playing field, they rarely 
compete in the marketplace. The NFL negotiates its television contracts, for example, in a single 
block. The revenues from broadcast rights are pooled. Indeed, the only interteam competition 
occurs when two teams are located in one major city, such as New York or Los Angeles. These 
teams compete with one another for home game attendance and local broadcast revenues. In all 
other respects, the league competes as a unit against other forms of entertainment. 
NASL, 459 U.S. at 1077 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).  
 95. 519 F. Supp. 581 (C.D. Cal. 1981), aff’d, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984) [hereinafter L.A. 
Coliseum]. 
 96. In 1978, Los Angeles Rams owner Caroll Rosenbloom moved his team from the Los Angeles 
Coliseum to a new stadium in Anaheim, California. The L.A. Coliseum, without an NFL team, 
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Davis from relocating his team to Los Angeles without unanimous approval 
of the other owners, was an unlawful restraint of trade.97  
In L.A. Coliseum, the Ninth Circuit held that the NFL was not a single 
entity for antitrust purposes.98 The Ninth Circuit directly followed the district 
court’s three justifications for rejecting the single entity defense. First, the 
court explained that if it extended the single entity defense to the NFL for the 
purpose of team relocation, the NFL would naturally attempt to expand the 
defense to claim exemption for all activities.99 The court refuted this claim by 
noting that courts had held that the NFL violated section 1 in other contexts 
in the past.100 Next, the Ninth Circuit determined that several prior courts had 
found that other organizations violated section 1 with cooperation among 
members similar to the coorperation that the NFL required among its 
teams.101 Finally, the court explained that all NFL teams have independent 
attempted to convince a team in another city to move to Los Angeles. See L.A. Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 
1384. However, Rule 4.3 of Article IV of the NFL Constitution required unanimous approval of all 
other team owners before one team could move within 75 miles of an existing team. The L.A. 
Coliseum was within 75 miles of the Rams’ new stadium in Anaheim, thus Rule 4.3 required approval 
before any team could relocate to Los Angeles. See id. (citing NFL CONST. art IV, rules 4.3, 4.1). 
Later in 1978, the NFL amended Rule 4.3 to require only three-quarters of team owners to approve 
before a team could move within 75 miles of another team. See 726 F.2d at 1385.  
 97. Id. at 1384-85.  
 98. Id. at 1390. While the court would not extend the single entity defense to preclude section 1 
scrutiny altogether, the court did at least consider the league’s function as a single unit in its Rule of 
Reason analysis. See supra Part II.A for discussion of Rule of Reason. The court noted that “the 
singular nature of the NFL will need to be accounted for in discussing the reasonableness of the 
restriction on team movement.” Id. 
 99. Id. at 1387-88.  
 100. Id. at 1388 (citing 519 F. Supp. at 583). The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that other courts 
had found the NFL in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act in “other areas” in which league rules 
operated. Id. (citing N. Am. Soccer League v. Nat’l Football League, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982), 
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982) [hereinafter NASL] (NFL rule preventing owners from also owning 
professional teams in a different league); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978) 
(NFL rules governing player contracts); Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 
1976) (NFL rules governing player contracts); Kapp v. Nat’l Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. 
Cal. 1974), affirmed, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979) (NFL rules 
governing player contracts)). 
 The court of appeals further showed its fear of creating a blanket exemption to the Sherman Act 
by quoting NASL: 
To tolerate such a loophole would permit league members to escape antitrust responsibility for any 
restraint entered into by them that would benefit their league or enhance their ability to compete 
even though the benefit would be outweighed by its anticompetitive effects. Moreover, the 
restraint might be one adopted more for the protection of individual league members from 
competition than to help the league. 
L.A. Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1388 (quoting NASL, 670 F.2d at 1257). 
 101. 726 F.2d at 1388. The court determined that “other organizations have been found to violate 
§ 1 though their product was ‘just as unitary . . . and requires the same kind of cooperation from the 
organization’s members.’” Id. (quoting 519 F. Supp. at 583). The district court in L.A. Coliseum 
discussed cases in which the Supreme Court found section 1 violations even though cooperation of an 
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economic values, a characteristic more consistent with several separate 
economic entities than with a single entity.102 In further exploring this final 
justification for rejecting the single entity defense, the Ninth Circuit reasoned 
that although the League divides approximately 90% of its revenue equally 
among its member teams, profits and losses were dispersed unevenly among 
the teams.103 This variance in profit levels created a different value for each 
team, a feature inconsistent with the concept of a single economic entity.104  
The dissent in L.A. Coliseum wholly disagreed with the majority’s 
assertion that the NFL is not a single entity as a matter of law.105 The dissent 
believed that the district court, as well as the majority which affirmed it, 
“placed an unwarranted emphasis upon the formalistic aspects of the [NFL 
and its member teams],” such as the respective teams’ independent 
ownership and legal identity.106 The dissent believed that in focusing on the 
formal organization of the NFL and its teams, the majority ignored the way 
the League actually operated as a single unit.107 The dissent claimed that the 
crucial question in determining whether formally distinct teams nevertheless 
function as a single economic entity for antitrust law is whether they 
“compete in any economically meaningful sense in the marketplace.”108 The 
organization’s members was necessary to promote the organization as a whole. See 519 F. Supp. at 
583-84 (discussing Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (finding section 1 violation in 
Associated Press’ by-laws, which prevented competitors of existing members from joining the 
Associated Press, even though cooperation among current Associated Press members was necessary to 
spread news throughout the entire Associated Press); Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 
341 (1963) (finding section 1 violation even though the Stock Exchange served as a mechanism for 
exchange of stocks between brokers, a function that no individual brokers could perform alone)).  
 102. L.A. Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1388. The court agreed with the district court that the NFL’s 
single entity defense was “based upon the false premise that the individual NFL ‘clubs are not separate 
business entities whose products have an independent value.’” Id. (quoting 519 F. Supp. at 584). 
 103. 726 F.2d at 1390.  
 104. Id. NFL teams share revenue resulting from national TV contracts and from sales of T-shirts, 
jerseys, caps, and NFL videos equally, regardless of how well each team’s particular clothing or 
videos sell. See Liz Clarke, New Builders: As Team Rings In New Season, Snyder Tries to Ring Up 
Sales, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 9, 1999, at G7. The variance in profit margins among teams stems 
from “independent management policies regarding coaches, players, management personnel, ticket 
prices, concessions, luxury box seats, as well as franchise location, all of which contribute to fan 
support and other income sources.” L.A. Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1390.  
 105. See 726 F.2d at 1401 (Williams, J., dissenting).  
 106. Id. at 1404. 
 107. See id. The dissent claimed that the determination of whether the NFL is a single economic 
entity must be based not only on “formalistic” aspects of the League, such as ownership, joint 
marketing, legal identity, and corporate law autonomy, but also on “substantive” aspects such as 
chains of command over League policy decisions, public perception, and economic interdependency of 
the member teams to the League as a whole. Id. To that extent, the dissent noted that substantively, 
“[t]he N.F.L. cannot truly be separated from its member [teams] . . . .” Id. 
 108. Id. (citing Gen. Bus. Sys. v. N. Am. Philips Corp., 699 F.2d 965, 980-81 (9th Cir. 1983)). 
The dissent noted that “[v]irtually every court to consider this question has concluded that [NFL] 
member [teams] do not compete with each other in the economic sense.” 726 F.2d at 1405 (citing N. 
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dissent believed that, realistically, the “interdependency of the member clubs 
and the indivisibility of the clubs with the [NFL]”109 make the League a 
single entity for purposes of antitrust law.110 
2. The Supreme Court’s Endorsement in Copperweld 
In 1984, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged the single entity 
defense in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.111 In Copperweld, 
Copperweld Corporation and its wholly owned tube manufacturing 
subsidiary, Regal Tube Company, joined forces to keep a new manufacturing 
firm, Independence Tube Corporation, out of the heavy tube manufacturing 
market in the United States.112 The district court and the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that this collaboration was an illegal conspiracy in 
restraint of trade.113 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a parent 
Am. Soccer League v. Nat’l Football League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1251 (2d Cir. 1982); Smith v. Pro 
Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 
619 (8th Cir. 1976); Mid-South Grizzlies v. Nat’l Football League, 550 F. Supp. 558, 562 (E.D. Pa. 
1982); United States v. Nat’l Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319, 323-24 (E.D. Pa. 1953)). The dissent, 
distinguishing between competition on and off the field, finally stated: 
The paradox to which I return, as the root of why the N.F.L., as well as other sports leagues, must 
be regarded as a “single entity” is that the keener the on-field competition becomes, the more 
successful their off-the-field, and ultimately legally relevant, collaboration. The formal entities, 
including the member clubs . . . which the district court ruled to be competitors cannot compete, 
because the only product or service which is in their separate interests to produce can only result 
as a fruit of their joint efforts. 
726 F.2d at 1407. 
 109. Id. at 1404. 
 110. Id.  
 111. 467 U.S. 752 (1984).  
 112. See id. at 755-57 for the full substantive background of Copperweld. Basically, Copperweld 
and its wholly owned subsidiary, Regal Tube, contacted several banks, realtors, and potential suppliers 
and customers of upstart Independence Tube to discourage them from doing business with 
Independence Tube. One threatening letter from Copperweld and Regal caused Yoder Co. to void a 
contract with Independence Tube in which Yoder had agreed to build a mill for Independence Tube to 
produce its metal tubing. Because Independence Tube was forced to arrange for another company to 
build its mill, it began operating nine months later than it would have if Yoder had not voided the 
original contract. Id. Independence Tube sued Copperweld and Regal, claiming they conspired to 
violate section 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 757-58.  
 113. Id. at 757-59. The Seventh Circuit questioned the wisdom of holding Copperweld and Regal 
liable for a section 1 conspiracy violation when, due to the lack of two legal persons, they would 
escape liability if Regal were an unincorporated division of Copperweld. See Independence Tube 
Corp. v. Copperweld Corp., 691 F.2d 310, 316-18 (7th Cir. 1982), rev’d, 467 U.S. 752 (1984). 
However, relying on its own precedent in Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980), overruled by Copperweld, 467 U.S. 752 (1984), the Seventh 
Circuit held that liability was appropriate “when there is enough separation between the two entities to 
make treating them as two independent actors sensible.” Copperweld, 691 F.2d at 318. It further held 
that the jury instructions properly allowed the jury to determine how much separation existed between 
Copperweld and Regal and that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude they were two 
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corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary corporation are incapable of 
conspiring with each other for purposes of section 1 of the Sherman Act.114 
The holding in Copperweld reversed the Court’s long time 
acknowledgment of the “intra-enterprise doctrine,” which it had casually 
cited in several earlier cases.115 The “intra-enterprise doctrine” provided that 
“§ 1 liability is not foreclosed merely because a parent and its subsidiary are 
subject to common ownership.”116 In finally analyzing the doctrine,117 the 
Court decided that, contrary to its previous position, “[a] parent and its 
wholly owned subsidiary have a complete unity of interest,”118 and courts 
should therefore treat the two organizations as a single entity for antitrust 
purposes.119 
The Copperweld Court noted the fundamental distinction between 
concerted and independent activity for Sherman Act purposes.120 It 
concluded that Congress intended to treat concerted activity more strictly 
because it “is fraught with anticompetitive risk” because it “deprives the 
marketplace of the independent centers of decisionmaking that competition 
independent actors. See id. at 318-20. 
 114. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 777. The Court limited its inquiry to the narrow issue of whether a 
parent and its wholly owned subsidiary could conspire in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. 
at 767. The Court specifically declined to consider “under what circumstances, if any, a parent may be 
liable for conspiring with an affiliated corporation it does not own.” Id. 
 115. In Copperweld, the Court noted that while it had cited the “intra-enterprise doctrine” with 
approval on numerous occasions, it had never considered the merits of the doctrine in depth. 467 U.S. 
at 760. See, e.g., Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 215 (1951) 
(holding that two wholly owned subsidiaries of a liquor distiller had illegally conspired in violation of 
section 1 by jointly refusing to supply a wholesaler who refused to follow a maximum resale pricing 
scheme); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 227 (1947) (noting that a vertical integration 
leading to a section 1 violation “may result as readily from a conspiracy among those who are 
affiliated or integrated under common ownership as from a conspiracy among those who are otherwise 
independent”). See also 467 U.S. at 764 (noting that in Kiefer-Stewart, 340 U.S. at 215, the Court, 
“[w]ith only a citation to Yellow Cab and no further analysis . . . stated that the ‘suggestion runs 
counter to our past decisions that common ownership and control does not liberate corporations from 
the impact of the antitrust laws’”). 
 116. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 759.  
 117. See supra note 115 (conceding that the Supreme Court never truly analyzed the “intra-
enterprise doctrine” before Copperweld). 
 118. 467 U.S. at 771. 
 119. Id.  
 120. Id. at 767. The Court recognized that, unlike concerted action that is prohibited by section 1 
of the Sherman Act if it unreasonably restrains trade, “the conduct of a single firm is governed by 
section 2 alone and is unlawful only when it threatens actual monopolization. It is not enough that a 
single firm appears to ‘restrain trade’ unreasonably, for even a vigorous competitor may leave that 
impression.” Id. In further determining that Congress did not intend to restrict a single firm’s business 
strategies with section 1, the Court explained: “Congress authorized Sherman Act scrutiny of single 
firms only when they pose a danger of monopolization. Judging unilateral conduct in this manner 
reduces the risk that the antitrust laws will dampen the competitive zeal of a single aggressive 
entrepreneur.” Id. at 768.  
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assumes and demands.”121 The Court initially conceded that nothing in the 
wording of section 1 affords the single entity defense even to officers of the 
same company.122 Nevertheless, the Court determined that an agreement 
between officers of the same company does not bring about the evils of 
monopoly that Congress intended the Sherman Act to prevent,123 and 
therefore the officers “do not provide the plurality of actors imperative for a 
§ 1 conspiracy.”124 The Court, applying reasoning parallel to that used in 
analyzing an agreement between officers of the same company,125 noted that 
courts must also treat the coordinated conduct between a corporation and one 
of its unincorporated divisions as the conduct of a single actor.126 Finally, 
following the same line of analysis,127 the Court extended the single entity 
defense to a corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary, claiming they 
“have a complete unity of interest. Their objectives are common, not 
disparate; their general corporate actions are guided or determined not by two 
separate consciousnesses [sic], but one.”128  
Copperweld indicated that the courts should look at the reality, and not 
the structure of an enterprise to determine if it is a single entity.129 In 
analyzing the reality of an enterprise, the courts should ignore legal or 
 121. Id. at 768-769. 
 122. Id. at 769. 
 123. Id. at 769. The Court further explained that an agreement among officers of a single firm is 
not as dangerous as concerted behavior because it does not “bring together economic power that was 
previously pursuing different goals.” Id. Conversely, a conspiracy among formerly independent 
business entities “reduces the diverse direction in which economic power is aimed [and] suddenly 
increases the economic power moving in one particular direction. . . . [T]heir anticompetitive potential 
is sufficient to warrant scrutiny even in the absence of incipient monopoly.” Id. For a discussion on the 
evils the Sherman Act was intended to prevent, see supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 124. 467 U.S. at 769. 
 125. Compare id. at 769 (noting that agreements among officers of the same company are not 
section 1 violations because they “do not suddenly bring together economic power that was previously 
pursuing divergent goals”), with id. at 770-71 (“Because coordination between a corporation and its 
division does not represent a sudden joining of two independent sources of economic power previously 
pursuing separate interests, it is not an activity that warrants § 1 scrutiny.”). 
 126. Id. at 770.  
 127. Compare id. at 771 (“If a parent and a wholly owned subsidiary do ‘agree’ to a course of 
action, there is no sudden joining of economic resources that had previously served different interests, 
and there is no justification for § 1 scrutiny.”), with supra note 125. 
 128. Id. at 771. 
 129. Id. at 772. The Court, in criticizing the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine, noted that it:  
looks to the form of an enterprise’s structure and ignores the reality. Antitrust liability should not 
depend on whether a corporate subunit is organized as an unincorporated division or a wholly 
owned subsidiary. A corporation has complete power to maintain a wholly owned subsidiary in 
either form. The economic, legal, or other considerations that lead corporate management to 
choose one structure over the other are not relevant to whether the enterprise’s conduct seriously 
threatens competition. 
 Id. 
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economic considerations causing an organization’s management to choose 
one structure of business over another.130 Instead, the courts should examine 
whether the parent has control over a subsidiary acting in a manner 
inconsistent with the parent’s best interests.131  
3. Post Copperweld Litigation 
Since Copperweld, several courts have faced the proposition that NASL 
and L.A. Coliseum no longer control the issue of whether the NFL constitutes 
a single entity incapable of violating section 1 of the Sherman Act. Each 
court has been unwilling to extend the reasoning in Copperweld to the 
NFL.132 Commentators currently disagree on whether courts should extend 
Copperweld’s single entity defense to professional sports leagues.133 
In 1995, the Fourth Circuit took the first step in allowing a professional 
sports league to assert the single entity defense in Seabury Management, Inc. 
v. Professional Golfers Ass’n of America, Inc. (“PGA”).134 Even though the 
 130. See id. at 772. 
 131. See id. at 771-72. 
 132. See, e.g., St. Louis Convention & Visitors Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 154 F.3d 851 
(8th Cir. 1998) (noting that the district court had rejected argument that Copperweld overruled Raiders 
I, i.e., L.A. Coliseum, on the issue of NFL as a single entity and continuing on with section 1 analysis); 
Sullivan v. Nat’l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091, 1099 (1st Cir. 1994) (“We do not agree that 
Copperweld . . . affects prior precedent concerning the NFL.”); McNeil v. Nat’l Football League, 790 
F. Supp. 871, 879-80 (D. Minn. 1992) (holding that Copperweld did not apply to the NFL and its 
member teams and finding teams to be separate entities capable of conspiring together under section 
1). 
 133. Compare, e.g., Lee Goldman, Sports, Antitrust, and the Single Entity Theory, 63 TUL. L. 
REV. 751, 755 (1989) (noting that several commentators believe that the validity of the single entity 
defense, as rejected in L.A. Coliseum, must be reconsidered after Copperweld and concluding that 
some league decisions should be treated as those of a single entity), and J. Scott Hale, Jerry Jones 
Versus the NFL: An Opportunity to Apply Logically the Single Entity Defense to the NFL, 4 SPORTS 
LAW. J. 1, 12 (1997) (claiming that the NFL should be treated as a single entity for purposes of pooled 
merchandise agreements because the teams all share equally in the revenue), with Timothy R. Deckert, 
Multiple Characterizations for the Single Entity Argument?: The Seventh Circuit Throws an Airball in 
Chicago Professional Sports Limited Partnership v. National Basketball Association, 5 VILL. SPORTS 
& ENT. L.J. 73, 101-02 (1998) (noting problems with analyzing the single entity defense in 
professional sports leagues one facet of the league at a time), and Lynn Reynolds Hartel, Community-
Based Ownership of a National Football League Franchise: The Answer to Relocation and Taxpayer 
Financing of NFL Teams, 18 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 589, 608-09 (1998) (claiming it is “now well 
established” that the NFL is not a single entity and discussing the First Circuit’s rejection of the 
defense in Sullivan v. NFL, 34 F.3d 1091 (1st Cir. 1994)).  
 134. Seabury Mgmt., Inc. v. Prof’l Golfers Ass’n, No. 94-1814, 1995 WL 241379 (4th Cir. Apr. 
26, 1995), aff’g in relevant part, 878 F. Supp. 771 (D. Md. 1994). Seabury Management, the plaintiff, 
alleged that “the PGA and MAPGA, a PGA section, conspired to limit Seabury’s ability to conduct a 
golf trade show in violation of the Sherman Act.” 878 F. Supp. at 777. This obviously differs from the 
normal fact pattern involving a professional sports league’s assertion of the single entity defense, 
where either (1) the plaintiff accuses a league of conspiring with its member teams, or (2) the plaintiff 
accuses member teams of conspiring with each other. Nonetheless, the Fourth Circuit became the first 
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Supreme Court in Copperweld specifically limited its holding to a parent 
corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary,135 the Fourth Circuit in PGA 
noted that it had earlier used the functional test articulated by the Supreme 
Court136 to find other related entities incapable of a section 1 violation.137 The 
Fourth Circuit applied Copperweld’s test to the PGA and the Middle Atlantic 
Section of Professional Golfers’ Association (“MAPGA”), an independently 
owned and separately incorporated section of the PGA.138 The court 
concluded that the two associations constituted a single economic entity 
incapable of conspiring in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.139 
In 1996, the Seventh Circuit became the first court to extend the single 
entity defense to a traditional professional sports league and its member 
teams in Chicago Professional Sports Limited Partnership v. National 
Basketball Association.140 Using rationale that has commentators at odds,141 
the court concluded that “when acting in the broadcast market the NBA is 
closer to a single firm than to a group of independent firms.”142 The court’s 
most basic reasoning was that the NBA “produces a single product; 
cooperation is essential (a league with one team would be like one handed 
clapping); and a league need not deprive the market of independent centers 
to extend the single entity defense to a professional sports league in any context.  
 135. Seabury, 1995 WL 241379, at *2 (recognizing that the Supreme Court “specifically declined 
to decide whether a parent corporation may conspire ‘with an affiliated corporation it does not 
completely own’”) (quoting Copperweld Corp. v. Independent Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767 (1984)).  
 136. See supra text accompanying notes 129-131 (discussing Copperweld’s functional test for 
applying the single entity defense). 
 137. See 1995 WL 241379, at *2. See also, e.g., Oksanen v. Page Mem’l Hosp., 945 F.2d 696, 
703-705 (4th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (examining “the substance, rather than the form, of the relationship” 
and the degree of control exercised by a hospital’s Board of Trustees to find the hospital and its 
medical staff incapable of conspiring), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1074 (1992); Advanced Health-Care 
Servs., Inc. v. Radford Cmty. Hosp., 910 F.2d 139, 146 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding two wholly owned 
subsidiaries of the same parent corporation are legally incapable of conspiring). 
 138. 1995 WL 241379, at *3. 
 139. Id. The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s reasoning and conclusion that the PGA 
and MAPGA constituted a single entity. Id. The district court had earlier reasoned that:  
[T]he sections [including the MAPGA] are governed by the PGA Constitution . . . . It is true that 
each section maintains its own revenues, has its own by-laws, elects its own officers and often 
conducts programs intended to benefit member of that section only. The sections’ actions, 
however, must be approved by the PGA to ensure that they are in the best interest of the 
organization as a whole. 
878 F. Supp. at 777-78.  
 140. 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 141. Compare Deckert, supra note 133, at 101-02 (noting possible problems with Chicago Sports 
Partnership), with Goldman, supra note 133, at 795-96 (arguing for single entity analysis of the NFL 
one facet at a time in an article written prior to the Seventh Circuit opinion in Chicago Sports 
Partnership).  
 142. 95 F.3d at 600. 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p287 note Crandall.doc  7/17/01   5:08 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
308 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 79:287 
 
 
 
 
 
of decisionmaking.”143 The court decided that the NBA looks more or less 
like a single entity, depending on which facet of league business the court 
analyzed.144 Moreover, relying partly on the Supreme Court’s dictum in 
Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.,145 the Seventh Circuit decided that more than 
one characterization of a sports league is possible,146 and that “[s]ports are 
sufficiently diverse . . . to investigate their organization and ask 
 143. Id. at 598-99. The NBA conceded that it formally consisted of 30 separate corporations or 
partnerships—29 teams and the league itself. However, it argued that it functioned “as a single entity, 
creating a single product (‘NBA Basketball’) that competes with other basketball leagues (both college 
and professional), other sports (‘Major League Baseball’, ‘college football’), and other entertainments 
such as plays, movies, opera, TV shows, Disneyland, and Las Vegas.” Id. at 597. 
 The court of appeals decided that separate ownership gives each owner a great incentive to field a 
better team to booster local support and make the contests more exciting. When each owner strives to 
better his or her respective team, the level of competition rises, and the NBA as a whole becomes more 
attractive to fans when compared against other basketball leagues, other sports in general, and other 
non-sports related forms of entertainment. Id. at 597-598. Noting that these separate owners do not 
form a cartel, the court of appeals concluded that “antitrust law permits, indeed encourages, 
cooperation inside a business organization the better to facilitate [sic] competition between that 
organization and other producers.” Id. at 598. 
 The court of appeals had earlier discussed the Supreme Court’s reliance on the fact that, unlike 
concerted action, a parent-subsidiary combination does not “deprive[] the marketplace of the 
independent centers of decisionmaking that competition assumes” without also increasing efficiencies 
that come with integration. Id. at 598 (quoting Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 769). The court decided that 
the NBA agreements fit in this middle ground such that they may reduce the number of 
decisionmakers yet may improve efficiency at the same time. Id. 
 144. Id. at 599. The court explained how the appearance of the NBA is different depending on 
which facet of the league the court examines: 
From the perspective of fans and advertisers (who use sports telecasts to reach fans), “NBA 
Basketball” is one product from a single source even though the Chicago Bulls and Seattle 
Supersonics are highly distinguishable, . . . . But from the perspective of college basketball players 
who seek to sell their skills, the teams are distinct, and because the human capital of players is not 
readily transferable to other sports . . . the league looks like a group of firms acting as a 
monopsony. 
Id. at 599. A monopsony is generally defined as a “market in which there is only one buyer of a good, 
service, or resource.” CAMPBELL R. MCCONNELL & STANLEY L. BRUE, MICROECONOMICS G-15 
(1996). 
 145. 518 U.S. 231 (1996). In Brown, The Supreme Court held that the NFL’s unilaterally imposed 
fixed salary for developmental squad players fell within the scope of the nonstatutory labor exemption 
from the Sherman Act. Id. at 235. The Court did not analyze the single entity defense, but in dictum 
conceded that: 
[T]he clubs that make up a professional sports league are not completely independent economic 
competitors, as they depend upon a degree of cooperation for economic survival . . . . In the 
present context, however, that circumstance makes the league more like a single bargaining 
employer, which analogy seems irrelevant to the legal issue before us. 
Id. at 248-49 (citation omitted). The court of appeals in Chicago Sports Partnership, after quoting the 
Brown dictum above and recognizing that the Supreme Court found it hard to characterize the NFL, 
decided that “[t]o say the league is ‘more like a bargaining employer’ than a multi-employer unit is not 
to say that it necessarily is one, for every purpose.” 95 F.3d at 599.  
 146. 95 F.3d at 599.  
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Copperweld’s functional question one league at a time—and perhaps one 
facet of a league at a time.”147 
III. ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES 
A. Application of the Sports Broadcasting Act to DIRECTV 
Should the Shaw court have applied the current SBA to exempt from 
section 1 of the Sherman Act the NFL teams’ pooled agreement to sell their 
broadcast rights to DIRECTV? Both the legislative history and other courts’ 
interpretations of the SBA indicate that it should not.148  
The Third Circuit in Shaw correctly determined on interlocutory appeal 
that the current SBA does not exempt the NFL’s pooled contract with 
DIRECTV from section 1 of the Sherman Act.149 The NFL faced a fourth 
down and long situation when it decided to assert an SBA exemption to its 
DIRECTV contract. The language of the SBA exempts “sponsored 
telecasting” of professional sports games.150 Moreover, when Pete Rozelle, 
former commissioner of the NFL, testified about the SBA in 1961, he 
specifically acknowledged that the SBA would only apply to free telecasting 
of professional sports and not closed circuit or subscription television.151 
Furthermore, the courts have been unwilling to extend the SBA to pay 
television because the SBA is special interest legislation.152 Relying on the 
plain language of the SBA and the legislative history behind it, the Shaw 
court conclusively put the issue of SBA exemption for pay television to rest.  
The irony of this well-supported conclusion is that the court’s refusal to 
extend the SBA exemption to the NFL’s pooled sale of television rights to 
DIRECTV injures many of the consumers Congress intended the Sherman 
Act to protect.153 Consumers, like the law students in this Note’s opening 
hypothetical, and other consumers who simply want to watch the best NFL 
game available in the country each week, are economically worse off if the 
 147. Id. at 600. 
 148. See supra Part II.B for legislative history and judicial interpretation of the scope of the SBA.  
 149. Shaw v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., 172 F.3d 299, 303 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 150. See supra notes 16, 76-80 and accompanying text. 
 151. See Aug. 28 Hearings, supra note 67, at 36; Sept. 13 Hearings, supra note 77, at 4.  
 152. See, e.g., Shaw, 172 F.3d at 302-03 (“The NFL got what it lobbied for; it cannot now expect 
the federal courts to transform ‘narrow, discrete, special-interest’ legislation into a far broader 
exemption.”); Chicago Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship, 961 F.2d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 1992) (“The [SBA] is 
special interest legislation, a single-industry exception to a law designed for the protection of the 
public. . . . Special interest laws do not have ‘spirits,’ and it is inappropriate to extend them to achieve 
more of the objective the lobbyists wanted.”). 
 153. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.  
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courts force them to forego their first choice of paying for and enjoying the 
Sunday Ticket, and instead settle for their second choice of watching 
whatever happens to be the local free game that Sunday.154 
B. Application of the Single Entity Defense to the NFL 
Should the single entity defense be afforded to the NFL and its teams 
when pooling together to sell television broadcast rights? The courts and 
commentators now disagree on this issue.155 
As discussed earlier, even though a single actor can violate section 2 of 
the Sherman Act,156 section 1 only prohibits multiple parties from 
contracting, combining, or conspiring to restrain trade.157 This distinction is 
an important one. The NFL’s interaction with DIRECTV in Shaw did not 
constitute a section 2 monopoly violation because the NFL did not 
monopolize any relevant market of commerce.158 Rather, Shaw alleged that 
the NFL’s contract with DIRECTV constituted an unreasonable restraint of 
trade in violation of section 1.159 Therefore, if the NFL can successfully 
claim it acted as a single economic entity, it can escape Sherman Act liability 
altogether; it did not violate section 2, and section 1, which requires a 
combined act by multiple parties, would not apply. 
PGA160 and Chicago Sports Partnership161 indicate that the courts may 
extend the single entity defense to the sports world more liberally in the 
future.162 However, as discussed earlier, the majority of courts to address this 
 154. Basic microeconomic theory assumes that the consumer is rational and spends money in a 
manner which gives the consumer the most satisfaction possible given that consumer’s limited income. 
Thus, if a consumer pays the $159 for a yearly Sunday Ticket package, the consumer believes that the 
Sunday Ticket will give that consumer the most satisfaction for that amount of money. If the Sunday 
Ticket is taken away, the consumer will be forced to spend the same $159 on something else only 
because his first choice was unavailable. See generally MCCONNELL & BRUE, supra note 144, at 141-
44. If the consumer is forced to alter the set of goods purchased with the $159 previously spent on the 
Sunday Ticket, the consumer will realize less satisfaction for that amount of money and will therefore 
be in an economically inferior position. Id. at 142. 
 155. See supra Part II.C for judicial treatment of the single entity defense. 
 156. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text. 
 157. See supra notes 44, 54 and accompanying text. 
 158. See generally United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (“The offense of 
monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in 
the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power . . . .”). The NFL’s 
conduct does not fall within these confines of section 2. 
 159. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 160. Seabury Mgmt. Inc. v. Prof’l Golfers Ass’n, No. 94-1814, 1995 WL 241379 (4th Cir. Apr. 
26, 1995), aff’g in relevant part, 878 F. Supp. 771 (D. Md. 1994). 
 161. Chicago Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 961 F.2d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 
1992). 
 162. While the single entity defense is obviously recognized in other contexts, praised in 
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point have still denied the defense to professional sports leagues.163 Courts 
that have denied application of the single entity defense to sports leagues and 
the commentators who applaud these courts’ decisions generally have 
characterized each league as a collective group of multiple economic entities 
for all purposes.164 Although this type of blanket characterization creates 
consistent precedent,165 it defies Copperweld’s instructions, ignoring the 
reality of a professional sports league and instead focusing on its form. 
Copperweld indicates that the courts should apply a functional test, looking 
not at the formal organization, but at the reality of the enterprise and the 
extent a parent controls its subsidiary.166 The fact that a different individual 
owns each team should not end the inquiry. As correctly recognized in 
Chicago Sports Partnership, the reality of a professional sports league is that 
it functions as a single entity in some circumstances and functions as a group 
of independent competing firms in others.167 Using the test expressed in 
Copperweld,168 courts should “ask Copperweld’s functional question one 
league at a time—and perhaps one facet of a league at a time . . . .”169  
If courts are still to consider NASL and L.A. Coliseum good law, they 
should do so because, after applying Copperweld’s functional test, they 
determine that the several NFL teams in each case functioned as competitors 
with diverse interests and not simply because the teams had different 
ownership or different economic values. In NASL, the NFL enacted the 
cross-ownership rule specifically to protect the NFL from competition 
against other sports leagues and other forms of entertainment.170 Therefore, 
dissenting opinions, and widely debated by scholars, PGA and Chicago Sports Partnership are the first 
two cases to actually apply the defense to Sherman Act claims against professional sports leagues.  
 163. See supra Part II.C. 
 164. See, e.g., St. Louis Convention & Visitors Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 154 F.3d 851 
(8th Cir. 1998); Sullivan v. Nat’l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091, 1099 (1st Cir. 1994); L.A. Mem’l 
Coliseum Commission v. Nat’l Football League, 519 F. Supp. 581 (C.D. Cal. 1981), aff’d, 726 F.2d 
1381 (9th Cir. 1984); N. Am. Soccer League v. Nat’l Football League, 505 F. Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y. 
1980), rev’d, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982); McNeil v. Nat’l 
Football League, 790 F. Supp. 871, 879-80 (D. Minn. 1992).  
 165. See, e.g., Timothy R. Deckert, Multiple Characterizations for the Single Entity Argument?: 
The Seventh Circuit Throws an Airball in Chicago Professional Sports Limited Partnership v. National 
Basketball Association, 5 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 73, 101-02 (1998) (claiming that analyzing each 
individual facet of the league for single entity status merely complicates the issues and will lead to 
increased litigation).  
 166. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771-72 (1983). 
 167. See Chicago Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 95 F.3d 593, 599 (7th Cir. 
1996).  
 168. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text. 
 169. Chicago Sports P’ship, 95 F.3d at 600.  
 170. See N. Am. Soccer League v. Nat’l Football League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1254-55, cert. denied, 
459 U.S. 1074 (1982). See also supra text accompanying note 85 for a brief description of the NFL’s 
cross-ownership rule.  
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the reality of the relationship in this specific facet of the league is that the 
team owners had a complete unity of interest, all agreeing to focus their 
capital solely on improving the NFL and not on a competing sports league. In 
doing so, the NFL acted like a single economic entity and attempted to make 
the entire NFL more attractive to fans when compared to other sports leagues 
like the NASL.171 Therefore, after Copperweld, the courts should no longer 
give credence to NASL’s rejection of the single entity defense in analyzing 
the issue.  
In L.A. Coliseum, however, the Ninth Circuit correctly concluded that the 
NFL did not operate as a single entity in the context of team relocation.172 
Rule 4.3 of Article IV of the NFL Constitution required unanimous approval 
of all teams whenever a team wanted to move into the home area of another 
existing team.173 Therefore, Rule 4.3 protected individual teams from other 
teams, but did not protect the NFL from other sports leagues or other forms 
of entertainment. Thus, the reality was that the relationship among the teams 
was adversarial. Consequently, the NFL did not function as a single 
economic entity when it enacted or implemented the franchise relocation 
rule. As Chicago Sports Partnership indicates, however, just because the 
NFL was not acting as a single entity in the context of franchise relocation, 
this should not necessarily preclude the single entity defense in a different 
facet of the league.174 
IV. PROPOSAL 
The following two proposals are means to an economically desirable end. 
Consumers, if willing to pay the money and if technology permits, should be 
able to watch any football game in the country. DIRECTV makes this 
possible. If those people willing to pay the price for the Sunday Ticket in 
return for the opportunity to watch a football game in another city are forced 
to forego their first choice and instead settle for a local game, these 
consumers are worse off economically.175 Moreover, the Sunday Ticket is a 
luxury; people can live without it. The courts should allow the market to 
 171. See id. 
 172. This is not to suggest that a blanket characterization of the NFL as a group of multiple 
entities is always correct. However, in the specific context of team relocation, Copperweld’s functional 
test, discussed supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text, leads to a multi-entity conclusion. Each 
owner of a professional sports team competes for the entertainment dollar in his or her team’s home 
city. If an NFL team moved into the settled home city of another NFL team, they would then compete 
with each other for the consumer’s entertainment dollar, thereby creating diverse economic interests.  
 173. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text (discussing NFL Rules 4.3 and 4.1). 
 174. 95 F.3d at 600. 
 175. See supra note 154 for relevant microeconomic theory. 
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decide the price of the Sunday Ticket. If the price becomes too high, 
consumers will stop paying the yearly fee and DIRECTV will lower the price 
to a level consistent with the value placed on the Sunday Ticket by 
consumers.176 If courts invalidate the NFL’s pooled agreement with 
DIRECTV under the Sherman Act, and the consumer is injured by losing the 
Sunday Ticket altogether, the congressional intent behind the Sherman Act of 
protecting consumer welfare177 is actually frustrated. 
A. Congressional Amendment to the SBA 
The most concrete resolution to the antitrust problem of the Sunday 
Ticket would be an amendment to the current SBA. Congress enacted the 
original SBA as special interest legislation, driven by the NFL’s desire to 
incorporate all of its league games into a single network television 
contract.178 Pete Rozelle testified that when Congress enacted the SBA, it 
intended the statute to allow the NFL to contract solely with CBS. Rozelle 
then testified further: “perhaps 20 years from now the television picture will 
change. The single network may no longer be desirable, and it may become 
much better for the public and the league to use more than one network.”179  
The proper amendment to the SBA could benefit the public and the NFL, 
a result that could push Congress to update its special interest SBA. A 
potential problem with amending the SBA to exempt satellite and other pay 
television is that sports leagues might attempt to enter into exclusive pooled 
contracts with the satellite providers, thereby harming those individuals who 
were content with watching the local game on free television. An effective 
amendment to the SBA, therefore, should only exempt pooled contracts that 
supplement contracts for sponsored telecasts. I propose Congress amend the 
existing SBA by adding a supplemental exemption directly after the 
exemption for sponsored telecasting: 
In addition, such antitrust law shall not apply to any joint agreement 
by or among those persons and leagues listed above, by which the 
league sells or transfers the rights of such league’s member clubs in 
non-sponsored telecasting of the league’s games only so long as the 
 176. See supra note 154.  
 177. See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (noting the purpose of the 
Sherman Act was to prevent threats against consumer welfare); Shaw v. Dallas Cowboys Football 
Club, Ltd., 172 F.3d 299, 300 n.4 (3d Cir. 1999) (acknowledging that “[t]he antitrust laws were 
designed for the protection of the public”).  
 178. See Aug. 28 Hearings, supra note 67, at 31-35. 
 179. Id. at 35. 
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persons and leagues maintain an agreement for the concurrent 
broadcast of such games in sponsored telecasting. 
Under this amendment, if the NFL wants to offer a pooled package of 
games through the Sunday Ticket, it could only do so if it were already 
telecasting local games over a sponsored network as it does now. If the NFL 
chose to quit broadcasting games completely, it obviously could do so. 
However, it could not quit broadcasting on sponsored networks without 
losing the supplemental exemption for its DIRECTV broadcast.180  
Even though SBA committee hearings show that Pete Rozelle understood 
that the original SBA was only intended to exempt free telecasting of 
professional sports,181 there is no real explanation why only this exemption 
exists.182 Therefore, if an SBA amendment would simply allow additional 
viewing options for those fans who wish to subscribe to the Sunday Ticket, 
consumers are better off and the amendment would still be consistent with 
the intent of Congress in writing the SBA. 
B. NFL Treated as Single Entity in Certain Facets of League Action 
The second and more immediate resolution to the antitrust problem with 
the Sunday Ticket is that courts should conclude that, when selling pooled 
broadcast rights to a television network, the NFL teams function as a single 
economic entity.183 To avoid the blanket characterization trap into which 
many courts and commentators in the past have fallen,184 courts should 
follow the Seventh Circuit’s path in Chicago Sports Partnership and analyze 
the NFL and other professional sports leagues one facet of the league at a 
 
 
 180. This idea stems in part from the NFL’s attempt in Shaw to build a derivative exemption for 
satellite television into the existing SBA. This Note does not, however, argue that Shaw’s claim of a 
built-in derivative exemption to the current SBA is valid, but instead argues that on a similar theory, 
Congress could amend the SBA to include the supplemental exemption. 
 181. See Aug. 28 Hearings, supra note 67, at 36; Sept. 13 Hearings, supra note 77, at 4. 
 182. See supra note 77 (explaining probable rationale for limiting SBA to free “network 
telecasting”). 
 183. There is one possible pitfall with a court granting the single entity defense to the NFL for the 
purpose of entering a pooled contract with a television network: the NFL could conceivably deal 
exclusively with DIRECTV and other non-sponsored networks when its current television contracts 
with FOX, CBS, and ABC expire. Exclusive dealing would force fans to subscribe to a program like 
the Sunday Ticket or forego watching football on television altogether. This outcome does not seem 
likely, however. The NFL relies on its mass exposure on free television to promote its games in hopes 
that fans will spend money on NFL merchandise and tickets for viewing games live. Thus, the NFL 
would probably not discontinue its current sponsored telecasting of games, even if a court accepted the 
single entity defense. 
 184. See supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text (discussing the blanket characterization of the 
NFL as not a single entity for all purposes). 
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time.185 In Copperweld, the Supreme Court admittedly did not conclude that 
a professional sports league and its member teams are unable to conspire in 
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.186 However, the driving force 
behind the single entity defense as announced by the Supreme Court is that 
courts should look at the reality of the relationship and the control the parent 
has over the subsidiary in determining whether multiple organizations are 
actually functioning as a single economic entity.187 
When selling their pooled broadcast rights to a television network, the 
teams in the NFL are acting as a single entity. The NFL teams all share 
evenly in the television revenue,188 therefore all teams have a unity of interest 
in negotiating the best possible deal for the NFL as a whole. The different 
teams do not compete with one another in any economic sense when 
negotiating together for this common cause.189 Moreover, the Sunday Ticket 
contract embodies broadcast rights for the NFL as a whole so that, in this 
context, the parent league has complete control over the independent 
teams.190 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Sunday Ticket is a valuable option for certain sports fans such as the 
two law students in the opening hypothetical who are unsatisfied with free 
sports broadcasts. There is no evidence that the sponsored networks intend to 
create a nationwide means of satisfying these fans’ interest in watching 
games not offered locally. Therefore, if the courts were to invalidate the 
Sunday Ticket package as an illegal restraint of trade in violation of section 1 
of the Sherman Act, certain consumers would suffer by losing their first 
choice on how to spend their money while no consumers would benefit. This 
decrease in consumer welfare is the precise harm that Congress intended the 
Sherman Act to prevent.191 
 185. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
 186. See supra note 114 and accompanying text (explaining the holding in Copperweld and noting 
that the Supreme Court specifically declined to address the issue of whether a parent and non wholly-
owned corporation could conspire in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act). 
 187. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text (discussing the functional test set out by 
Copperweld for a single entity analysis). 
 188. See, e.g., Liz Clarke, New Builders: As Team Rings in New Season, Snyder Tries to Ring Up 
Sales, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 1999, at G7 (noting that each NFL team gets an equal share of the current 
eight-year television deal with network stations worth $17.6 billion).  
 189. See United States v. Nat’l Football League, 196 F. Supp. 445, 447 (E.D. Pa. 1961) (stating 
that teams agreed to allow the NFL commissioner to negotiate with networks to sell a package deal).  
 190. See id. 
 191. See supra note 42. 
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In order to follow the spirit of the Sherman Act, either Congress or the 
courts should act. Congress should amend the SBA to allow a supplemental 
exemption to satellite broadcasts of sports contests so long as the contests are 
also broadcast on free sponsored television for those consumers who do not 
wish to pay DIRECTV for the additional games. Until Congress acts, the 
courts should follow Copperweld’s structural test when analyzing the 
applicability of the single entity defense to sports leagues and recognize that, 
while selling its pooled broadcast rights to a television network, the NFL is 
acting as a single entity incapable of conspiring with itself in violation of 
section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
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